# 1NC

## FW

#### The role of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question- The aff’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s potential

#### Our interpretation is grammatically correct

Ericson 3 Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or policy into action **though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### This is prior question to debate

Shively 00 Ruth Lessl, Former Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Texas A&M, in “Political Theory and Partisan Politics”, Ed. Portis, Gundersen and Shively, pp. 181-182

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

#### Voting issue for limits and ground- there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote aff, these obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action- they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates.

#### Competitive debate is a dialogue between two teams- fairness is key to meaningful participation for both sides

Galloway 7 professor of communication at Samford University, Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

#### A limited topic of discussion is key to decision-making and advocacy skills- targets the discussion

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Discussion of policy-questions is crucial for skills development- posits students as agents of decision-making

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7¶ By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Switch-side debate encourages critical thinking and advocacy skills

Harrigan 8 Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.6-9

Additionally, there are social benefits to the practice of requiring students to debate both sides of controversial issues. Dating back to the Greek rhetorical tradition, great value has been placed on the benefit of testing each argument relative to all others in the marketplace of ideas. Like those who argue on behalf of the efficiency-maximizing benefits of free market competition, it is believed that arguments are most rigorously tested (and conceivably refined and improved) when compared to all available alternatives. Even for beliefs that have seemingly been ingrained in consensus opinion or in cases where the public at-large is unlikely to accept a particular position, it has been argued that they should remain open for public discussion and deliberation (Mill, 1975). Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do" (Ennis, 1987, p.10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are "issues of unsurpassed important in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people...being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking" (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that "The next Pearl Harbor could be 'compounded by hydrogen" (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p.3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007). In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, "with such learning, we Americans could prepare...not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet" (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called "the highest educational goal of the activity" (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate's critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches "conceptual flexibility," where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p,290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt and Louden, 1999; Colbert, 2002, p.82).

#### Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems

Lundberg 10 Christian O. Lundberg Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.¶ The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:¶ To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)¶ Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.¶ There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.¶ Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

## Case

## Will to Revenge

#### SQ drone policies are effective- cripples Al Qaida

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Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida's leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them.¶ My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants.¶ Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud at a funeral in the Tribal Areas. That strike reportedly killed 60 civilians attending the funeral, but not Mehsud. He was killed later by another drone strike in August 2009. His successor, Hakimullah Mehsud, developed a relationship with the foiled Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, who cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack.¶ Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm's way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists.¶ Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad.¶ What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida's senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland.¶ Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida's central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely.¶ Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan's Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden's letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult.¶ As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness.¶ The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military's footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.

#### Terrorism which ensures extinction

Sid-Ahmed 4 Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Al-Ahram Weekly political analyst, 2004, Al-Ahram Weekly, "Extinction!" 8/26, no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

#### Drones are key to power projection

Miller 13 Strategic Significance of Drone Operations for Warfare, Jack Miller, August 19, 2013, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/19/strategic-significance-of-drone-operations-for-warfare/

The application and integration of unmanned aircraft in the early 21st century mirrors the rise of manned planes in the early 20th century. Historically, the drone platform has faced skepticism and cultural opposition, followed by limited use in reconnaissance roles. RPAs were slowly integrated into ad-hoc roles, and now they are at a pivotal point in their evolution from operating in a tactical niche to occupying a defining role in future battles. In the words of a U.S. Army colonel, “We are building the bridge to the future while standing on it.”[67] Policy-makers must formulate a strategic framework for drones as a first step towards being prepared to act in a rapidly advancing technological world with complex strategic implications for U.S. military strategy and power projection. The speed and difficulty of policy making must be accounted for in order to create an effective doctrine for using unmanned aircraft. If the U.S. military and policy-making community get the strategic framework right, it will win the wars of the future. If it does not, it might build what one U.S. Army officer called, “The Maginot Line of the 21st century.”[68] As the United States’ strategic landscape changes, new technologies are integrated into American planning efforts. Platforms like drones have evolved within the strategic framework of the U.S. defense and policymaking community, and are now poised to play a focal role in the future of American power. However, the current policy debate and public discourse lags behind the evolution of the technology. Policy-makers are fixating on the use of the platform for targeted killings. This use is not indicative of the significance of neither drones nor their future use. With the proliferation of remotely operated and automated combat aircraft, the trend in military technology is moving toward missions carried out by automated warriors, with the human operators battling safely behind computer terminals miles away. Leaders must recognize that being on the leading edge of technology uncovers new societal questions. Thus one of the biggest effects of the UAV is in reshaping the narrative of warfare in how we conceptualize war, how we talk about it, and how we report it. Future campaigns will feature new questions about what is legal and ethical, resulting in dilemmas that will challenge many of the codes that have long shaped and regulated the practice of warfare. Therefore we are in the beginning of a process that will be of historic importance, as drones are forcing societies to reexamine what is possible and proper in war and politics. Given the rapid advancement of UAV technology and its global proliferation, it is time to start thinking about the future strategic implications of the platform. As the situation surrounding these once science fiction-like weapons has changed, so too must the public debate to reflect the growing presence of drones within military force structures. We are on “terra incognita” and must create a new approach to warfare that is characterized by rapidly advancing technological systems.

#### Heg solves nuclear war

Kagan 7 End of Dreams, Return of History, Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, July 17, 2007, policy review, no. 144, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136

Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

#### Must evaluate consequences- key to ethical and pragmatic decision-making

Isaac 2 Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale, Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### No impact to threat construction- executive constraints

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7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war.51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical inse- curity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.

#### It doesn’t escalate

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People are capable of perpetrating the most terrible acts of violence on their fellows. From before recorded history humans have killed humans, and violence is potentially present in every society. There is no escaping the fact that the capacity to develop a propensity for violence is part of human nature. But that does not mean that aggression is inevitable: temporary anger need not give rise to persistent hostility, and hostility need not give rise to acts of aggression. And people also have the capacity to care for the needs of others, and are capable of acts of great altruism and self-sacrifice. A subsidiary aim of this workshop is to identify the factors that make aggressive tendencies predominate over the cooperative and compassionate ones. Some degree of conflict of interest is often present in relationships between individuals, in the relations between groups of individuals within states, and in the relations between states: we are concerned with the factors that make such conflicts escalate into violence.

The answer to that question depends critically on the context. While there may be some factors in common, the bases of individual aggressiveness are very different from those involved in mob violence, and they differ yet again from the factors influencing the bomb-aimer pressing the button in a large scale international war. In considering whether acts which harm others are a consequence of the aggressive motivation of individuals, it is essential to recognise the diversity of such acts, which include interactions between individuals, violence between groups, and wars of the WW2 type. We shall see that, with increasing social complexity, individual aggressiveness becomes progressively less important, but other aspects of human nature come to contribute to group phenomena. Although research on human violence has focussed too often on the importance of one factor or another, it is essential to remember that violence always has multiple causes, and the interactions between the causal factors remain largely unexplored.

#### No root cause of war- consensus of experts is on our side

Holsti 91 Kalevi Jaakko, Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, On The Study Of War,” Peace And War: Armed Conflicts And International Order, 1648-1989, Published by Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521399297, p. 3

Investigators of conflict, crises, and war reached a consensus years ago that monocausal explanations are theoretically and empirically deficient. Kenneth Waltz’ (1957) classic typology of war explanations convincingly demonstrated various problems arising from diagnoses that locate war causation exclusively at the individual, state attribute, or systemic levels. He also illustrated how prescriptions based on faulty diagnoses offer no solution to the problem. Even Rousseau’s powerful exploration of the consequences of anarchy, updated by Waltz (1979), remains full of insights, but it only specifies why wars recur (there is nothing to prevent them) and offers few clues that help to predict when, where, and over what issues. Blainey (1973), in another telling attack on monocausal theories, continues where Waltz left off. He offers, on the basis of rich historical illustrations, both logical and anecdotal rebuttals of facile explanations of war that dot academic and philosophical thought on the subject. But rebuttals of the obvious are not sufficient. We presently have myriads of theories of war, emphasizing all sorts of factors that can help explain its etiology. As Carroll and Fink (1975) note, there are if anything too many theories, and even too many typologies of theories. Quoting Timascheff approvingly, they point out that anything might lead to war, but nothing will certainly lead to war.

#### Realism is inevitable- elites

Guzzini 98 Senior Research Fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and Associate Professor of Political Science, International Relations, and European Studies at the Central European University in Budapest, 1998, Stefano, Realism in International Relations, p. 212

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

#### Democracy checks worst forms of bio-power

Dickinson 4 Edward Dickenson, professor at the University of Cincinnati; “Biopolitics, Facism, Democracy, Central European History;” published in Central European History, Vol. 37, No. 1 2004

Why was Europe’s twentieth century, in addition to being the age of biopolitics and totalitarianism, also the age of biopolitics and democracy? How should we theorize this relationship? I would like to offer five propositions as food for thought. First, again, the concept of the essential legitimacy and social value of individual needs, and hence the imperative of individual rights as the political mechanism for getting them met, has historically been a cornerstone of some strategies of social management. To borrow a phrase from Detlev Peukert, this does not mean that democracy was the “absolutely inevitable” outcome of the development of biopolitics; but it does mean that it was “one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization.” Second, I would argue that there is also a causal fit between cultures of expertise, or “scientism,” and democracy. Of course, “scientism” subverted the real, historical ideological underpinnings of authoritarian polities in Europe in the nineteenth century. It also in a sense replaced them. Democratic citizens have the freedom to ask “why”; and in a democratic system there is therefore a bias toward pragmatic, “objective” or naturalized answers— since values are often regarded as matters of opinion, with which any citizen has a right to differ. Scientific “fact” is democracy’s substitute for revealed truth, expertise its substitute for authority. The age of democracy is the age of professionalization, of technocracy; there is a deeper connection between the two, this is not merely a matter of historical coincidence. Third, the vulnerability of explicitly moral values in democratic societies creates a problem of legitimation. Of course there are moral values that all democratic societies must in some degree uphold (individual autonomy and freedom, human dignity, fairness, the rule of law), and those values are part of their strength. But as people’s states, democratic social and political orders are also implicitly and often explicitly expected to do something positive and tangible to enhance the well-being of their citizens. One of those things, of course, is simply to provide a rising standard of living; and the visible and astonishing success of that project has been crucial to all Western democracies since 1945. Another is the provision of a rising standard of health; and here again, the democratic welfare state has “delivered the goods” in concrete, measurable, and extraordinary ways. In this sense, it may not be so simpleminded, after all, to insist on considering the fact that modern biopolitics has “worked” phenomenally well. Fourth, it was precisely the democratizing dynamic of modern societies that made the question of the “quality” of the mass of the population seem— and not only in the eyes of the dominant classes — increasingly important. Again, in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the expected level of the average citizen’s active participation in European political, social, cultural, and economic life rose steadily, as did the expected level of her effective influence in all these spheres. This made it a matter of increasing importance whether the average person was more or less educated and informed, more or less moral and self-disciplined, more or less healthy and physically capable, more or less socially competent. And modern social reform — “biopolitics” defined very broadly—seemed to offer the possibility of creating the human foundation for a society ordered by autonomous participation, rather than by obedience. This too was part of the Machbarkeitswahn of modernity; but this was potentially a democratic “Wahn,” not only an authoritarian one. Fifth, historically there has been a clear connection between the concept of political citizenship and the idea of moral autonomy. The political “subject” (or citizen — as opposed to the political subject,who is an object of state action) is also a moral subject. The citizen’s capacity for moral reasoning is the legitimating postulate of all democratic politics. The regulation of sexual and reproductive life has long been understood in European societies to be among the most fundamental issues of morality. There is, therefore, a connection between political citizenship on the one hand, and the sexual and reproductive autonomy implied in the individual control that is a central element of the modern biopolitical complex, on the other.

#### Biopolitics is good – only seeing it as bad ignores the massive decrease in structural violence it has caused and views power uni-directionally

**Dickinson 4** Edward Ross, University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, March

<This understanding of the democratic and totalitarian potentials of biopolitics at the level of the state needs to be underpinned by a reassessment of how biopolitical discourse operates in society at large, at the “prepolitical” level. I would like to try to offer here the beginnings of a reconceptualization of biopolitical modernity, one that focuses less on the machinations of technocrats and experts, and more on the different ways that biopolitical thinking circulated within German society more broadly. It is striking, then, that the new model of German modernity is even more relentlessly negative than the old Sonderweg model. In that older model, premodern elites were constantly triumphing over the democratic opposition. But at least there was an opposition; and in the long run, time was on the side of that opposition, which in fact embodied the historical movement of modern- ization. In the new model, there is virtually a biopolitical consensus.92 And that consensus is almost always fundamentally a nasty, oppressive thing, one that partakes in crucial ways of the essential quality of National Socialism. Everywhere biopolitics is intrusive, technocratic, top-down, constraining, limiting. Biopolitics is almost never conceived of— or at least discussed in any detail— as creating possibilities for people, as expanding the range of their choices, as empowering them, or indeed as doing anything positive for them at all. Of course, at the most simple-minded level, it seems to me that an assessment of the potentials of modernity that ignores the ways in which biopolitics has made life tangibly better is somehow deeply flawed. To give just one example, infant mortality in Germany in 1900 was just over 20 percent; or, in other words, one in five children died before reaching the age of one year. By 1913, it was 15 percent; and by 1929 (when average real purchasing power was not significantly higher than in 1913) it was only 9.7 percent.93 The expansion of infant health programs— an enormously ambitious, bureaucratic, medicalizing, and sometimes intrusive, social engineering project— had a great deal to do with that change. It would be bizarre to write a history of biopolitical modernity that ruled out an appreciation for how absolutely wonderful and astonishing this achievement— and any number of others like it — really was. There was a reason for the “Machbarkeitswahn” of the early twentieth century: many marvelous things were in fact becoming machbar. In that sense, it is not really accurate to call it a “Wahn” (delusion, craziness) at all; nor is it accurate to focus only on the “inevitable” frustration of “delusions” of power. Even in the late 1920s, many social engineers could and did look with great satisfaction on the changes they genuinely had the power to accomplish. Concretely, moreover, I am not convinced that power operated in only one direction — from the top down— in social work. Might we not ask whether people actually demanded welfare services, and whether and how social workers and the state struggled to respond to those demands? David Crew and Greg Eghigian, for example, have given us detailed studies of the micropolitics of welfare in the Weimar period in which it becomes clear that conflicts between welfare administrators and their “clients” were sparked not only by heavyhanded intervention, but also by refusal to help.94 What is more, the specific nature of social programs matters a great deal, and we must distinguish between the different dynamics (and histories) of different programs. The removal of children from their families for placement in foster families or reformatories was bitterly hated and stubbornly resisted by working-class families; but mothers brought their children to infant health clinics voluntarily and in numbers, and after 1945 they brought their older children to counseling clinics, as well. In this instance, historians of the German welfare state might profit from the “demand side” models of welfare development that are sometimes more explicitly explored in some of the international literature.95 In fact, even where social workers really were attempting to limit or subvert the autonomy and power of parents, I am not sure that their actions can be characterized only and exclusively as part of a microphysics of oppression. Progressive child welfare advocates in Germany, particularly in the National Center for Child Welfare, waged a campaign in the 1920s to persuade German parents and educators to stop beating children with such ferocity, regularity, and nonchalance. They did so because they feared the unintended physical and psychological effects of beatings, and implicitly because they believed physical violence could compromise the development of the kind of autonomous, selfreliant subjectivity on which a modern state had to rely in its citizenry.96 Or, to give another common example from the period, children removed from their families after being subjected by parents or other relatives to repeated episodes of violence or rape were being manipulated by biopolitical technocrats, and were often abused in new ways in institutions or foster families; but they were also being liberated. Sometimes some forms of the exercise of power in society are in some ways emancipatory; and that is historically significant. Further, of course we must ask whether it is really true that social workers’ and social agencies’ attempts to manipulate people worked. My own impression is that social policy makers grew increasingly aware, between the 1870s and the 1960s, that their own ends could not be achieved unless they won the cooperation of the targets of policy. And to do that, they had to offer people things that they wanted and needed. Policies that incited resistance were — sometimes with glacial slowness, after stubborn and embittered struggles—de-emphasized or even abandoned. Should we really see the history of social welfare policy as a more or less static (because the same thing is always happening) history of the imposition of manipulative policies on populations? I believe a more complex model of the evolution of social policy as a system of social interaction, involving conflicting and converging demands, constant negotiation, struggle, and— above all— mutual learning would be more appropriate. This is a point Abram de Swaan and others have made at some length; but it does not appear to have been built into our theory of modernity very systematically, least of all in German history.97

#### Bare life is a bad theory because it can’t account for the effect of legal interventions like the aff

Jef Huysmans 8, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the Open University, UK, The Jargon of Exception—On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of Political Society, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 165–183

Even if one would argue that **Agamben’s framing** of the current political conditions are valuable for understanding important changes that have taken place in the twentieth century and that are continuing in the twenty ﬁrst, they also **are** to a considerable extent **depoliticizing**. Agamben’s work tends to guide the analysis to unmediated, factual life. For example, some draw on Agamben to highlight the importance of bodily strategies of resistance. One of the key examples is individual refugees protesting against their detention by sewing up lips and eyes. They exemplify how individualized naked life resists by deploying their bodily, biological condition against sovereign biopolitical powers (for example, Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004:15–17). I follow Adorno and others, however, that such a conception of bodily, **naked life** is not political. It **ignores** how this life only exists and takes on political form through various socioeconomic, technological, scientiﬁc, **legal**, and other **mediations**. For example, the images of the sewed-up eyelids and lips of the individualized and biologized refugees have no political signiﬁcance without being mediated by public media, intense mobilizations on refugee and asylum questions, contestations of human rights in the courts, etc. **It is these mediations that are the object and structuring devices of political struggle**. Reading **the politics of exception** as the central lens onto modern conceptions of politics, as both Agamben and Schmitt do, **erases** from the concept of politics a rich and constitutive history of **sociopolitical struggles**, traditions of thought linked to this history, and key sites and temporalities of politics as well as the central processes through which individualized bodily resistances gain their sociopolitical signiﬁcance.

#### “No value to life” doesn’t outweigh---prioritize existence because value is subjective and could improve in the future

Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

## Cultural Narration

#### Methodological focus is bad

Jackson 11 Patrick Thadeus Jackson is associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations,” p. 57-59

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to worry endlessly about foundational assumptions. At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. Hirschman (1970b, 338) noted this very danger, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the focus on producing internally consistent packages of assumptions instead of actually examining complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis. Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles as uniquely scientific, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a firmer scientific footing by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but only after the fundamentals have been soundly established. Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

#### Presumption---challenging cultural foundation doesn’t solve the decisionmakers in Washington.

#### Narratives are entirely subjective and has no external criteria for evaluation

Chartier 1 Gary, Lecturer in Business Ethics – La Sierra University, 7 UCLA Asian Pac. Am. L.J. 105, Spring

Chang maintains that poststructuralism is "anti-foundational," implying that this is so because it offers us "a conception of language and knowledge that is not based on any universalist theoretical ground. ..." [35](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n35" \t "_self) Chang thus enthusiastically joins in the wholesale contemporary rejection of foundationalism. Our knowledge, he argues, is local knowledge. Anti-foundationalism "provides for certainty, but only within the local, partisan point of view, which is posited as the only available point of view." [36](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n36" \t "_self) Poststructuralism's emphasis on the limits of human speech and knowledge rules out criticisms of narrative as subjective and partial. According to Chang, "since all standpoints are equally validated (or invalidated), there is no longer any compelling reason to privilege any viewpoint. To state it differently, my personal narrative is as relevant as your personal narrative, and since both of them are equally relevant, they are equally irrelevant." [37](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n37" \t "_self) Chang recognizes that this conclusion entails what might seem to be unpalatable consequences. Some people, he observes, "want to be able to say ... that all Nazis are bad, all of the time." Apparently, however, on his version of poststructuralism one cannot do this: "To try to make a universal, ahistorical claim about all Nazis being bad is meaningless because the phrase 'all Nazis are bad' has meaning only in certain contexts." Anti-foundationalism cannot, he concedes, "provide a compelling 'ought' in the rigorous sense of the word." But we need not be troubled by this; after all "ought" has been on shaky ground ever since David Hume said, "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. ..." [38](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n38" \t "_self) Does characterizing all stories as "equally irrelevant" cut the nerve of social critique? Chang relates the horrifying story of Nguyen Hen Van, jailed on a theft charge but inadvertently brought to court as the defendant in a murder case in place of another Vietnamese man housed in the same jail. Witnesses and even the real murder defendant's lawyer failed to realize that the wrong defendant was in court. Nguyen Hen Van's cries of "Not me, not me" went unheard until the end of the  [\*115]  trial. [39](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n39" \t "_self) Is it obvious that the narratives of the witnesses and the attorney - narratives in which he purportedly plays a part - should be regarded as just as relevant as those of Nguyen Hen Van, confused with another member of southern California's still relatively small and marginal Vietnamese minority? Chang obviously - and rightly - does not think so. But he is not altogether persuasive when he explains why critique remains possible on his view, when he describes how we should think about contests among alternative personal and group narratives. His poststructuralist understanding of epistemology and ethics does not render political action impossible; if anything, it does the opposite, in the sense that political action is all that will be left. The poststructuralist critique changes the present game, which involves the search for legitimation, by eliminating the possibility of any appeal to an external standard for legitimation. It becomes, as if it were ever anything but, a question of power, where no one can claim a superior legitimacy or deny the legitimacy of another's viewpoint or story. ... Narratives, then, cannot be discounted because in this game of power there is no "objective" standard for disqualification. One "wins" by being more persuasive. Narratives, especially those about personal oppression, are particularly well-suited for persuasive purposes because they can provide compelling accounts of how things are in society. These stories will carry considerable persuasive power because in our present political-legal climate, which is dominated by liberal political philosophy, oppression is bad. Oppression, when recognized, requires redress. [40](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d4ff9c09a0b1bcca46091e75e448605b&docnum=9&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkAA&_md5=609651beecc28c621ac9287fd9302116&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all" \l "n40" \t "_self)

#### That turns the aff

Cosgrove 3 Lisa, “Feminism, Postmodernism, and Psychological Research” *Hypatia* vol 18, no 3, Fall 2003, project muse

Perhaps the best example of how feminists may inadvertently reproduce and reinforce the “false ontology of gender” can be found in the work of American psychologists who have appropriated feminist standpoint theory 3 (for example, see Belenky, Clinchy, and Goldberger 1986; Jack 1991; and especially *Meeting at the crossroads: Women’s psychology and girls’ development*, by Brown and Gilligan (1992) that resulted from the Harvard Project on Women’s Psychology and Girls’ Development). Clearly, these scholars have contributed greatly to the field of psychology, and their work has illuminated the androcentrism of previous developmental theories. Indeed, one of the insights of standpoint theory—that the researcher’s location must be critically analyzed—has the potential to radicalize all aspects of the research process. As Lorraine Code points out, the purpose of feminist standpoint theory is to “expose the unnaturalness of a patriarchal social order. . . . not to aggregate women within a single, unified, or putatively representative standpoint” (1998, 181). However, insofar as feminist standpoint psychologists assume a view of the self that is (even implicitly) grounded in a liberal humanist tradition, a tradition that emphasizes the sovereignty of the subject, the radicality of their work is undermined. Hence, theories of girls’ development and the relational theory of the self espousedby Carol Gilligan and the scholars at The Stone Center (see, for example, Brown and Gilligan 1992), have been criticized for their **essentialism and intra-individualistic** focus. The hegemony of the essentialist claim of “women’s” experience or voice has had the unfortunate effect of **reinforcing normative** gendered **behavior.** More specifically, the claim that women are relational, that they respond with an interpersonal ethics of care and privilege relationships over rules and rights (Brown and Gilligan, 1992; Gilligan 1993), leaves gendered norms intact. There is a crucial difference between saying *femininity is symbolized* as relational and saying that *women* are relational (Layton 1998, 217). Unfortunately, essentialist interpretations of women’s (or girls’) voice conflate the two and homogenize difference **and heterogeneity**. In this way **essentialism reinforces the “tyrannical dimension of identity and marginalizes acts of disidentification**” (Pujal 1998, 44). Ironically, under the rubric of celebrating “difference” or appreciating “women’s relational style,” we are **reproducing the very discourse that guarantees masculine privilege**. As Kathy Davis astutely notes, by defining voice “as a psychological entity . . . as the psychological locus of femininity. . . . [researchers] obscure how women construct and reproduce their identities” (1994, 360). Brinton Lykes makes a related point in her critique of self-in-relation theories in general and of Brown and Gilligan’s work in particular: “Although the sample of girls interviewed [in Brown and Gilligan’s study] is ‘more diverse,’ culture, class, and ethnicity or race are descriptive categories that seem, despite the authors’ ‘responsive listening’ to these girls’ voices, to have little to do with the girls’ experiences” (1994, 347). She suggests that researchers conceptualize social class, culture, and gender “not as descriptors of autonomous, free standing individuals, but as ways of thinking about women’s sense of self . . . [the analysis of women and girls’] discourses [will then] reveal a less individualistic, less intra-focused notion of self” (347–8). Indeed, Lykes’s point is well taken: the issue is not with standpoint theory or with the metaphor of voice per se. Rather, the problem is that the implicit assumptions made aboutgender, experience, and identity—and the metaphors used to gather data about them (for example, voice)—do not allow for an analysis of the complexity of the power relations of whichgender, identity, and experience are embedded. “Suspending our commitment to traditional ‘given’ meanings of terms” (Hepburn 1999b, 8), such as “women’s voice,” or acknowledging the fragmented and often contradictory nature of subjectivity, does not have to mean that we relinquish our commitment to feminism or our commitment to try and understand the meaning of women’s experiences.

#### Their invocation of Geronimo gets re-approprated---recreates case impacts.

Pugliese 2013 (Joseph, Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, Sydney. State violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of torture, black sites, drones. “Genocidal caesurae and the militarization of Native American country” Pages 46-55)

The iterative logic of the colonial nomenclature of occupation and conquest, that has its roots in the wars against Native Americans, is evidenced by the naming of the US colonial war in the Philippines as 'lnjun warfare, ' and the declaration that the islands would not be secure 'until the niggers are killed off like the lndians '; and the naming by the US military of Vietnam, at the time of the Vietnam War, as 'Indian Country,' and Vietnamese as 'Indians.' More recently, Iraq was termed by the US military as the 'Wild West' and the fortress in Shkin, Afghanistan, as t h e 'Alamo." Perhaps the most flagrant example of this symbolic violence is the code-naming of Osama bin Laden as 'Geronimo' : The president and his advisers watched Leon E. Panetta, the CIA director, on a video screen, narrating from his agency's headquarters across the Potomac River what was happening in faraway Pakistan. 'They've reached the target,' he said. Minutes passed. 'We have a visual on Geronimo,' he said. A few minutes later: ' Geronimo EKIA.' Enemy Killed in Action. There was silence in the Situation Room. Finally, the president spoke up. 'We got him.’ Another report quotes the following: a 'Seal then shot bin Laden in the chest and again in the head with his M4 rifle, and said over his radio: "For God and country - Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo" - the code word for a hit on bin Laden. '81 In this pivotal moment of the war on terror, the Indian wars are contemporized and re-situated at the symbolic heart of this war. The visual of bin Laden is encoded as Geronimo, iconic leader of the Chiricahua Apache in the anti-colonial Apache Wars. Through this loaded act of superimposition, the Native American warrior is criminalized, conceptually recoded as a terrorist, and the Native American wars against colonial invasion of their lands are scripted as the wars of domestic terrorists. Geronimo, as enemy killed in action, is symbolically executed by the US state in the guise of a contemporary terrorist. This is the moment in which the US state reappropriates and secures its imperial sovereignty - precisely through a double death; a twin execution that topologically locates its absolute outside (Arab/Muslim terrorist) as already inside (Native American insurgent). Geronimo, through this discursive resignification and double death, is transmuted into the trophy of a triumphant imperial power that cannot vanquish too many times its anti-colonial insurgents: even when they are long dead, as in Geronimo's case, they must be killed again. In a profound meditation on the ongoing cultural valency of Geronimo in US culture, Durham writes: 'In the American myth, Apaches are a symbol of inscrutable cruelty. Is Geronimo's name invoked because he evokes American fear - a fear that has been "conquered"? If so, then the fearsome "object" has obviously not been conquered at all. 'Geronimo, in this neo-imperial reincarnation, is the revnant that cannot be killed: as ghost of a dense, unresolved history of colonial violence, he continues to reanimate the colonist’s symbolic imaginary and to haunt its very claims to legitimacy. Activated in this heavily mediated moment or state assassination is a palimpsest of repetitions, slippages and collisions of signs, histories and subjects. The historically anachronistic enunciation - 'we have a visual on Geronimo' - violently sutures two heterogeneous faces in the process of collapsing two radically different geopolitical histories. This same enunciation, as a moment of obsessive repetition, discloses the state's tendency to homogenize its various others as interchangeably Other. It also exposes, however, the undiminished contestatory power that Geronimo still magnetizes so that he must be 'killed' once again in order to silence questions about the sovereign legitimacy of the colonial nation-state. The symbolic, colonial re-killing of Geronimo discloses yet another form of death. This other form of death refers to that living death that embodies, in Fanon's terms, the contemporary existence of the colonized: There is first of all, the fact that the colonized . . . perceives life not as a flowering or a development of an essential productiveness, but as a permanent struggle against death. This ever-menacing death is experienced as endemic famine, unemployment, a high death rate, an inferiority complex and the absence of any hope for the future. All this gnawing at the existence of the colonized tends to make life something of an incomplete death. As the trophy of a triumphant colonialism, Geronimo revenant embodies the incomplete death of Native Americans surviving ongoing regimes of economic, cultural and political expropriation and ecological devastation, as a form of ecocide, that contemporizes the traditional genocidal practices of the colonial state. The ecocide that has been visited upon Native Americans assumes the form of weapons testing, mining and the dumping of the toxic waste of the colonizers on their lands and in their rivers . Within the ecologically devastated spaces that now constitute the lands of the Western Shoshone nation called Newe Sogobia, the biopolitical caesura of human/ animal positions its captive subjects along a violent hierarchy of life and death. In the words of an Owens Valley Paiute elder, Native Americans are viewed by white authorities as 'nonpeople' and thus, through the deployment of a form of 'environmental racism,' they are scripted as expendable by both the US government and the various corporations that conduct their ecocidal operations on their land. The extensive picture of the nuclear testing program has unfolded in the lands of Newe Sogobia includes the exposure of the Western Shonhone to the toxic fallout of the tests: the experimental use of live pigs, dressed in army uniforms to see how they would withstand the blast, filmed by 'the remote-controlled camera [that] captured the pigs writhing and squealing as they died,' and a 'herd of horses that wandered east onto the Sheahan lands with their eyes burnt out, left empty sockets by a blast. These haunting images of useless suffering evidence the disposable lives of those subjects violently cut off from 'the culture' and positioned in the lethal vestibule of the colonizer. In this exercise of state violence, the targets of the state 's speciesism (immolated pigs and blinded horses) and raciospeciesism (Native Americans as 'nonpeople ') live and die under the decree of the biopolitical caesura. For Carrie Dann and her sister Mary, the lived violence of this biopolitical categorization and partitioning is encapsulated by the fact that, as Native Americans, they are 'under the jurisdiction of a department that otherwise manages "natural resources" - trees, animals, parks, and so forth.’ The Dann sisters spell out the ramifications of this biopolitical assignation and its attendant caesura: 'I don't know if we 're the human species or some other kind of species,' says Dann, to which her sister Mary sardonically replies: 'Endangered species.’

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## FW

#### Resolved before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School 4 5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"¶ Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### Restriction on authority must limit presidential discretion

Lobel 8 Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School Jules, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War” 392 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:391, <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf>

So  too, the congressional power to declare or authorize war has been long held to permit Congress to authorize and wage a limited war—“limited in place, in objects, and in time.” 63 When Congress places such restrictions on the President’s authority to wage war, it limits the President’s discretion to conduct battlefield operations. For example, Congress authorized President George H. W. Bush to attack Iraq in response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, but it confined the President’s authority to the use of U.S. armed forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions directed to force Iraqi troops to leave Kuwait. That restriction would not have permitted the President to march into Baghdad after the Iraqi army had been decisively ejected from Kuwait, a limitation recognized by President Bush himself.64

#### Fairness is a prior question- rigorous testing is key to understand if they education provided is useful

Zappen 4 James, Prof. Language and Literature – Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, “The Rebirth of Dialogue: Bakhtin, Socrates, and the Rhetorical Tradition”, p. 35-36

Finally, Bakhtin describes the Socratic dialogue as a carnivalesque debate between opposing points of view, with a ritualistic crownings and decrownings of opponents. I call this Socratic form of debate a contesting of ideas to capture the double meaning of the Socratic debate as both a mutual testing of oneself and others and a contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives. Brickhouse and Smith explain that Socrates' testing of ideas and people is a mutual testing not only of others but also of himself: Socrates claims that he has been commanded by the god to examine himself as well as others; he claims that the unexamined life is not worth living; and, since he rarely submits to questioning himself, "it must be that in the process of examining others Socrates regards himself as examining his own life, too." Such a mutual testing of ideas provides the only claim to knowledge that Socrates can have: since neither he nor anyone else knows the real definitions of things, he cannot claim to have any knowledge of his own; since, however, he subjects his beliefs to repeated testing, he can claim to have that limited human knowledge supported by the "inductive evidence" of "previous elenctic examinations." This mutual testing of ideas and people is evident in the Laches and also appears in the Gorgias in Socrates' testing of his own belief that courage is inseparable from the other virtues and in his willingness to submit his belief and indeed his life to the ultimate test of divine judgment, in what Bakhtin calls a dialogue on the threshold. The contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives and their ritualistic crowning/decrowning is evident in the Gorgias in Soocrates' successive refutations and humiliations of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.

#### Debate role-play activates agency

Hanghoj 8 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 ¶ Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish¶ Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of¶ Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have¶ taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the¶ Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab¶ Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant¶ professor.

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf¶

Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

#### Debating war powers is key to political agency- it affects everyone

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

#### Our framework allows debaters to speak from their subject location as long as they do it to defend a topical policy.

Hodson 9 professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, Derek, “Towards an Action-oriented Science Curriculum,” Journal for Activist Science & Technology Education, Vol. 1, No. 1¶ \*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

Politicization of science education can be achieved by giving students the opportunity to confront **real world issues that have a scientific, technological or environmental dimension.** By grounding content in socially and personally relevant contexts, an issues-based approach can provide the motivation that is absent from current abstract, de-contextualized approaches and can form a base from which students can construct understanding that is personally relevant, meaningful and important. It can provide increased opportunities for active learning, inquiry-based learning, collaborative learning and direct experience of the situatedness and multidimensionality of scientific and technological practice. In the Western contemporary world,¶ technology is all pervasive; its social and environmental impact is clear; its disconcerting social implications and disturbing moral-ethical dilemmas are made apparent almost every day in popular newspapers, TV news bulletins and Internet postings. In many ways, it is much easier to recognize how technology is determined by the sociocultural context in which it is located than to see how science is driven by such factors. It is much easier to see the environmental impact of technology than to see the ways in which science impacts on society and environment. For these kinds of reasons, it makes good sense to use problems and issues in technology and engineering as the major vehicles for contextualizing the science curriculum. This is categorically not an argument against teaching science; rather, it is an argument for teaching the science that informs an understanding of everyday technological problems and may assist students in **reaching tentative** **solutions** about where they stand on key SSI.

#### The impact of narratives on the law is a reason to vote for the best policy – pure narrative focus fails

Orna Ben-Naftali 3, Head of the International Law Division and of the Law and Culture Division, The Law School, The College of Management Academic Studies, Spring 2003, ARTICLE: 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 Cornell Int'l L.J. 233

Our analysis concludes that while a specific act of preemptive killing may be legal if it meets the above-specified requirements, the policy of state targeted preemptive killings is not. Furthermore, some specific acts of targeted killings may generate state responsibility, while others may constitute a war crime entailing criminal accountability. These conclusions, emanating from the reading of the three legal texts applicable to the context, and informed by a sensibility that coheres them, do not rest on a negation of the importance of the national interest in security. On the contrary, these conclusions incorporate and express the way it should be balanced with a minimum standard of humanity and against the relevant context. This delicate, ever precarious balance is at the heart of the democratic discourse. A democratic state is not a meek state. True, it is fighting with "one hand tied behind its back,"n342 as soberly observed by Chief Justice Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, but democratic sensibilities internalize this limitation on State power, not as a source of weakness but as a sign of strength. Democracies require a public discourse forever alert to the importance of human rights, suspicious of the way power is used, and committed to the rule of law. The legal culture, in turn, while not a substitute for this public discourse, is never absent from it and indeed serves as a catalyst for its development. We therefore reject the notion that the policy of targeted killings, designed by Israel as a way to combat terrorist attacks, is beyond the purview of the rule of law.n343 We also deny the purist position suggesting that the legalistic nitty-gritty preoccupation with details entailed in the above discussion is likely to obscure and legitimize a harrowing policy; n344 one that, on principle, should be condemned. n345 This position in fact maintains that the legality or illegality of targeted state killings is not a legitimate issue of discussion; that while an emergency situation may exceptionally necessitate the deed, it should never be elevated to the sphere of the Word. n346 We appreciate the sensibility of this position, but, alas, do not find it sensible. Indeed, nor would the people who consider themselves victims of the policy of targeted killings, and appeal to the courts to intervene. n347 Purity belongs to the Platonic world of ideas; it is a necessary ideal to strive for, even if forever unachievable in this all too fallible City of Man. n348 In the best of all possible worlds law would be superfluous; in this world, it is a necessary, albeit insufficient means to achieve some possible betterment. This article hopes to contribute to this modest goal.

#### The right fills in

Orly Lobel 7, University of San Diego Assistant Professor of Law, 2007, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics,” 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf

Both the practical failures and the fallacy of rigid boundaries generated by extralegal activism rhetoric permit us to broaden our inquiry to the underlying assumptions of current proposals regarding transformative politics — that is, attempts to produce meaningful changes in the political and socioeconomic landscapes. The suggested alternatives produce a new image of social and political action. This vision rejects a shared theory of social reform, rejects formal programmatic agendas, and embraces a multiplicity of forms and practices. Thus, it is described in such terms as a plan of no plan,211 “a project of projects,”212 “anti-theory theory,”213 politics rather than goals,214 presence rather than power,215 “practice over theory,”216 and chaos and openness over order and formality. As a result, the contemporary message rarely includes a comprehensive vision of common social claims, but rather engages in the description of fragmented efforts. As Professor Joel Handler argues, the commonality of struggle and social vision that existed during the civil rights movement has disappeared.217 There is no unifying discourse or set of values, but rather an aversion to any metanarrative and a resignation from theory. Professor Handler warns that this move away from grand narratives is self-defeating precisely because only certain parts of the political spectrum have accepted this new stance: “[T]he opposition is not playing that game . . . . [E]veryone else is operating as if there were Grand Narratives . . . .”218 Intertwined with the resignation from law and policy, the new bromide of “neither left nor right” has become axiomatic only for some.219 The contemporary critical legal consciousness informs the scholarship of those who are interested in progressive social activism, but less so that of those who are interested, for example, in a more competitive securities market. Indeed, an interesting recent development has been the rise of “conservative public interest lawyer[ing].”220 Although “public interest law” was originally associated exclusively with liberal projects, in the past three decades conservative advocacy groups have rapidly grown both in number and in their vigorous use of traditional legal strategies to promote their causes.221 This growth in conservative advocacy is particularly salient in juxtaposition to the decline of traditional progressive advocacy. Most recently, some thinkers have even suggested that there may be “something inherent in the left’s conception of social change — focused as it is on participation and empowerment — that produces a unique distrust of legal expertise.”222 Once again, this conclusion reveals flaws parallel to the original disenchantment with legal reform. Although the new extralegal frames present themselves as apt alternatives to legal reform models and as capable of producing significant changes to the social map, in practice they generate very limited improvement in existing social arrangements. Most strikingly, the cooptation effect here can be explained in terms of the most profound risk of the typology — that of legitimation. The common pattern of extralegal scholarship is to describe an inherent instability in dominant structures by pointing, for example, to grassroots strategies,223 and then to assume that specific instances of counterhegemonic activities translate into a more complete transformation. This celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems to rely on an aggregate approach — an idea that the multiplication of practices will evolve into something substantial. In fact, the myth of engagement obscures the actual lack of change being produced, while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social reform produces a false belief in the potential of change. There are few instances of meaningful reordering of social and economic arrangements and macro-redistribution. Scholars write about decoding what is really happening, as though the scholarly narrative has the power to unpack more than the actual conventional experience will admit.224 Unrelated efforts become related and part of a whole through mere reframing. At the same time, the elephant in the room — the rising level of economic inequality — is left unaddressed and comes to be understood as natural and inevitable.225 This is precisely the problematic process that critical theorists decry as losers’ self-mystification, through which marginalized groups come to see systemic losses as the product of their own actions and thereby begin to focus on minor achievements as representing the boundaries of their willed reality. The explorations of micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and the prescriptive. The manifestations of extralegal activism — the law and organizing model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate nongovernmental sphere of action — all produce a fantasy that change can be brought about through small-scale, decentralized transformation. The emphasis is local, but the locality is described as a microcosm of the whole and the audience is national and global. In the context of the humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies from the 1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter including works on American cities and neighborhoods in trouble.226 The aspiration of these genres was that each individual story could translate into a “time of the nation” body of knowledge and motivation.227 In contemporary legal thought, a corresponding gap opens between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality, although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-statenational federations have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline.228 There is, therefore, an absence of links between the local and the national, an absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed “the missing middle” by Professor Theda Skocpol.229 New social movements have for the most part failed in sustaining coalitions or producing significant institutional change through grassroots activism. Professor Handler concludes that this failure is due in part to the ideas of contingency, pluralism, and localism that are so embedded in current activism.230 Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive debate? It is important for next-generation progressive legal scholars, while maintaining a critical legal consciousness, to recognize that not all extralegal associational life is transformative. We must differentiate, for example, between inward-looking groups, which tend to be self-regarding and depoliticized, and social movements that participate in political activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge and reform existing realities.231 We must differentiate between professional associations and more inclusive forms of institutions that act as trustees for larger segments of the community.232 As described above, extralegal activism tends to operate on a more divided and hence a smaller scale than earlier social movements, which had national reform agendas. Consequently, within critical discourse there is a need to recognize the limited capacity of small-scale action. We should question the narrative that imagines consciousness-raising as directly translating into action and action as directly translating into change. Certainly not every cultural description is political. Indeed, it is questionable whether forms of activism that are opposed to programmatic reconstruction of a social agenda should even be understood as social movements. In fact, when groups are situated in opposition to any form of institutionalized power, they may be simply mirroring what they are fighting against and merely producing moot activism that settles for what seems possible within the narrow space that is left in a rising convergence of ideologies. The original vision is consequently coopted, and contemporary discontent is legitimated through a process of self-mystification.

#### Policy relevant deliberation is the only way to alter war powers

Mellor 13 The Australian National University, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Department Of International Relations,   
“Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,” European University Institute, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, DOA: 8-14-13, y2k

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

#### A focus on policy is necessary to learn the pragmatic details of powerful institutions

McClean 1 Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Molloy College in New York, 2001, David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope”, Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/

Or we might take Foucault who, at best, has provided us with what may reasonably be described as a very long and eccentric footnote to Nietzsche (I have once been accused, by a Foucaltian true believer, of "gelding" Foucault with other similar remarks). Foucault, who has provided the Left of the late 1960s through the present with such notions as "governmentality," "Limit," "archeology," "discourse" "power" and "ethics," creating or redefining their meanings, has made it overabundantly clear that all of our moralities and practices are the successors of previous ones which derive from certain configurations of savoir and connaisance arising from or created by, respectively, the discourses of the various scientific schools. But I have not yet found in anything Foucault wrote or said how such observations may be translated into apolitical movement or hammered into a political document or theory (let alone public policies) that can be justified or founded on more than an arbitrary aesthetic experimentalism. In fact, Foucault would have shuddered if any one ever did, since he thought that anything as grand as a movement went far beyond what he thought appropriate. This leads me to mildly rehabilitate Habermas, for at least he has been useful in exposing Foucault's shortcomings in this regard, just as he has been useful in exposing the shortcomings of others enamored with the abstractions of various Marxian-Freudian social critiques.Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group,those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing lessthan a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Action through the state doesn’t uphold it, but the claim that we should never debate state politics makes change impossible

Krause and Williams 97 Keith and Michael, Critical Security Studies, p. xvi

First, to stand too far outside prevailing discourses is almost certain to result in continued disciplinary exclusion. Second, to move toward alternative conceptions of security and security studies, one must necessarily reopen the question subsumed under the modern conception of sovereignty and the scope of the political. To do this, one must take seriously the prevailing claims about the nature of security. Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not only of obligation but of effective political action. In the realm of organized violence states also remain the preeminent actors. The task of a critical approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in this realm but, rather, to understand more fully its structures, dynamics, and possibilities for reorientation. From a critical perspective, state action is flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy need not therefore be tantamount to embracing the statist assumptions of orthodox conceptions. To exclude a focus on state action from a critical perspective on the grounds that it plays inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions simply reverses the error of essentializing the state. Moreover, it loses the possibility of influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary world politics.

#### Switch-side debate prevents moral dogmatism

Muir 93 Star, Prof. Comm. – George Mason U., Philosophy and Rhetoric, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, 26(4), pp. 288-290

Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values— tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. The willingness to recognize the existence of other views, and to grant alternative positions a degree of credibility, is a value fostered by switch-side debate: Alternately debating both sides of the same question . . . inculcates a deep-seated attitude of tolerance toward differing points of view. To be forced to debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side. , . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .Promoting this kind of tolerance is perhaps one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer. 5' Theactivity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this fact who become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted.""\* While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance. At a societal level, the value of tolerance is more conducive to a fair and open assessment of competing ideas. John Stuart Mill eloquently states the case this way: Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. . . . the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race. . . . If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth, produced by its collision with error."\*' At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathic and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacity to engage in self-refiective questioning, to reason dialogically and dialectically. and to "reconstruct alien and opposing belief systems empathically."\*- Our system of beliefs is. by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for rational reasons; that is, when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits, moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical thought and moral identity, he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of opposing views and the weaknesses of our own beliefs. Role playing, he reasons, is a central element of any effort to gain such insight. Only an activity that requires the defense of both sides of an issue, moving beyond acknowledgement to exploration and advocacy, can engender such powerful role playing. Redding explains that "debating both sides is a special instance of role-playing,""" where debaters are forced to empathize on a constant basis with a position contrary to their own. This role playing, Baird agrees, is an exercise in reflective thinking, an engagement in problem solving that exposes weaknesses and strengths,\*\* Motivated by the knowledge that they may debate against their own case, debaters constantly pose arguments and counter-arguments for discussion, erecting defenses and then challenging these defenses with a different tact."\*' Such conceptual flexibility, Paul argues, is essential for effective critical thinking, and in turn for the development of a reasoned moral identity.

#### Substantive debates about the costs of war are the only way to make connections troops and the war itself

Julian E. Zelizer 11, Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton University, "War powers belong to Congress and the president", June 27, [www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/27/zelizer.war.powers/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/27/zelizer.war.powers/index.html)

But the failure of Congress to fully participate in the initial decision to use military force has enormous costs for the nation beyond the obvious constitutional questions that have been raised.¶ The first problem is that the U.S. now tends to go to war without having a substantive debate about the human and financial costs that the operation could entail. Asking for a declaration of war, and thus making Congress take responsibility for the decision, had required presidents to enter into a heated debate about the rationale behind the mission, the potential for large-scale casualties and how much money would be spent.¶ When presidents send troops into conflict without asking Congress for approval, it has been much easier for presidents to elude these realities. President Lyndon Johnson famously increased the troop levels in Vietnam without the public fully realizing what was happening until after it was too late.¶ Although Johnson promised Democrats when they debated the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 that they would only have a limited deployment and he would ask them again if the mission increased, he never did. He used the broad authority granted to him to vastly expand the operations during his presidency.¶ By the end of his time in office, hundreds of thousands of troops were fighting a hopeless war in the jungles of Vietnam. Johnson also continued to mask the budgetary cost, realizing the opposition that would emerge if legislators knew how much the nation would spend. When the costs became clear, Johnson was forced to request a tax increase from Congress in 1967, a request which greatly undermined his support.¶ The second cost of presidents going to war rather than Congress doing so is that major mistakes result when decisions are made so quickly. When there is not an immediate national security risk involved, the slowness of the legislative process does offer an opportunity to force policymakers to prove their case before going to war.¶ Speed is not always a virtue. In the case of Iraq, the president started the war based on the shoddiest of evidence about WMD. The result was an embarrassment for the nation, an operation that undermined U.S. credibility abroad.¶ Even in military actions that have stronger justifications, there are downsides to speed. With President Obama and the surge in Afghanistan, there is considerable evidence that the administration went in without a clear strategy and without a clear objective. With Libya, there are major concerns about what the administration hopes to accomplish and whether we are supporting rebel forces that might be connected with terrorist networks intent on harming the U.S.¶ The third cost has been the cheapening of the decision about using military force. In the end, the decision about whether to send human treasure and expend valuable dollars abroad should be one that is made by both branches of government and one that results from a national dialogue. Requiring Congress to declare war forces voters to think about the decision sooner rather than later.¶ While efficiency is essential, so too is the democratic process upon which our nation is built.¶ The result of the decision-making process that has been used in recent decades is that as a nation too many citizens lose their connection to the war. Indeed, most Americans don't even think twice when troops are sent abroad. The shift of power toward the president has compounded the effects of not having a draft, which Congress dismantled in 1973. Wars sometimes resemble just another administrative decision made by the White House rather than a democratic decision.¶ So Boehner has raised a fair point, though he and other Republicans don't have much ground to stand on given their own party's history. Republicans, like Democrats, have generally supported presidential-war power in addition to a weak Congress.¶ Most politicians have only worried about war power when it is politically convenient. Indeed, in 2007, then-Sen. Obama wrote, the "President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to this nation."¶ Clearly, Obama has not governed by the principles on which he campaigned.¶ It is doubtful whether the parties will do anything about this. The War Powers Resolution has not worked well and there seems to be little appetite to pass something else. But the consequences of the path that the nation has chosen are enormously high.¶ We've moved too far away from the era when Congress matters. As a result, the decision to use troops is too easy and often made in haste. Obama, who spoke about this issue so cogently on the campaign trail, should be a president who understands that reality.

#### Constraints are more conducive to creative thinking

Gibbert et al. 7 Michael Gibbert, Assistant Professor of Management at Bocconi University (Italy), et al., with Martin Hoeglis, Professor of Leadership and Human Resource Management at WHU—Otto Beisheim School of Management (Germany), and Lifsa Valikangas, Professor of Innovation Management at the Helsinki School of Economics (Finland) and Director of the Woodside Institute, 2007, “In Praise of Resource Constraints,” *MIT Sloan Management Review*, Spring, Available Online at https://umdrive.memphis.edu/gdeitz/public/The%20Moneyball%20Hypothesis/Gibbert%20et%20al.%20-%20SMR%20(2007)%20Praise%20Resource%20Constraints.pdf, p. 15-16

Resource constraints can also fuel innovative team performance directly. In the spirit of the proverb "necessity is the mother of invention," [end page 15] teams may produce better results because of resource constraints. Cognitive psychology provides experimental support for the "less is more" hypothesis. For example, scholars in creative cognition find in laboratory tests that subjects are most innovative when given fewer rather than more resources for solving a problem.¶ The reason seems to be that the human mind is most productive when restricted. Limited—or better focused—by specific rules and constraints, we are more likely to recognize an unexpected idea. Suppose, for example, that we need to put dinner on the table for unexpected guests arriving later that day. The main constraints here are the ingredients available and how much time is left. One way to solve this problem is to think of a familiar recipe and then head off to the supermarket for the extra ingredients. Alternatively, we may start by looking in the refrigerator and cupboard to see what is already there, then allowing ourselves to devise innovative ways of combining subsets of these ingredients. Many cooks attest that the latter option, while riskier, often leads to more creative and better appreciated dinners. In fact, it is the option invariably preferred by professional chefs.¶ The heightened innovativeness of such "constraints-driven" solutions comes from team members' tendencies, under the circumstances, to look for alternatives beyond "how things are normally done," write C. Page Moreau and Darren W. Dahl in a 2005 Journal of Consumer Research article. Would-be innovators facing constraints are more likely to find creative analogies and combinations that would otherwise be hidden under a glut of resources.

# 1NR

## Will 2 Revenge

### Terror DA

#### Terrorism DA outweighs and turns the aff---nuclear attack causes repressive societies, increased religious and ethnic tensions, and speed up nuclear arms race---causes extinction. That’s Sid-Ahmed---Turns will to revenge because the attack causes retaliation---empirically proven by Iraq war.

#### Yes it’s effective now---you should prefer our Johnson evidence over their Grayson or other studies they cite---it’s the MOST comprehensive study of counter-terror that cites operations and historical record about the effectiveness of decapitation strategy.

#### Comprehensive studies prove drones are effective- tanks terrorist organizations

Jones 12 Do Drone Strikes on al-Qaida Make Us Safer? Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor of International Security, the International Security Program's quarterly journal, series editor of the Belfer Center Studies in International Security, July 20, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/07/20/do-drone-strikes-on-al-qaida-make-us-safer/

Two studies published in the spring 2012 issue of the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center’s journal International Security present a different perspective. On the basis of comprehensive analyses of data on multiple terrorist and insurgent organizations, these studies conclude that killing or capturing terrorist leaders can reduce the effectiveness of terrorist groups or even cause terrorist organizations to disintegrate.¶ In “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” Bryan Price, who will soon join the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy, analyzed the effects of leadership attacks on 207 terrorist groups from sixty-five countries between 1970 and 2008. Price argues that the health of a terrorist organization is tied closely to the strength of its leadership. Removal of a charismatic leader can undermine a terrorist organization. In addition, leadership succession poses particular challenges in secretive organizations that do not institutionalize their operations or train lower-level leaders to assume control. Price finds that killing or capturing the leaders of a group significantly increases the probability that the group will collapse or dissolve, although the organization may endure for several years. This effect was much stronger for new groups; groups that have existed for twenty years are much more likely to survive the killing of their leaders. One of Price’s most important findings is that religious terrorist groups were almost five times more likely to end than nationalist groups after having their leaders killed.¶ Patrick Johnston, a former fellow in the Belfer Center’s International Security Program who is now at the RAND Corporation, considers whether leadership decapitation reduces the effectiveness of terrorist and insurgent groups. In “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” Johnston compares the consequences of 118 failed and successful attempts to kill top-level insurgent leaders. His study finds that removing the leaders of militant groups enables governments to defeat insurgencies more frequently, reduces the number of insurgent attacks, and diminishes levels of violence. Johnston points out that killing insurgent leaders does not guarantee success, but it increases the probability that governments will defeat insurgents by 25 to 30 percent. He also finds that killing leaders has a stronger effect than capturing them.¶ ¶ It remains to be seen whether U.S. killings of al-Qaida leaders will bring about the demise of that terrorist organization. So far, however, those killings seem to have disrupted al-Qaida and reduced the frequency of its actual and attempted terrorist attacks on the United States and U.S. citizens, although al-Qaida remains a significant threat. The studies by Price and Johnston suggest that the United States should continue its policies of targeting top terrorist leaders. If their conclusions are correct, the Obama administration may be on target in its calculation that the benefits of decapitation strikes outweigh the costs.

#### It’s try or dei---Absolute rejection of drones are counter-productive---alternatives are morally worse---prefer pragmatic, middle-ground approach to counter-terror---this also impact-turns their religion arguments.

Tooley 13 Mark Tooley is president of the Institute on Religion and Democracy. “Drone policy can be moral policy,” 8-15-13, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/wp/2013/08/15/drone-policy-can-be-moral-policy/> DOA: 8-15-13, y2k

In many cases drone critics, if not absolute pacifists, are de facto pacifists who cannot imagine a situation when lethal force is ever justified. Often they reinvent Just War into an impossible standard applicable in no real world situation. And even many religious non-pacifists imagine that Just War’s intent is entirely a restraint on force, when actually the tradition sometimes commands force in defense of the innocent and wider justice. Do drones defend the innocent and promote a wider justice? All warfare, like all human activity, is morally flawed. But demanding perfection only guarantees paralysis. Drone critics typically imagine that neutralizing terrorists is actually a conventional law enforcement challenge rather than a cause for military force. They expect or imply that increased international collaboration would compel local regimes to apprehend and lawfully detain terrorists. Ideally they would be right. But Christian ethics and most other traditional religious perspectives understand that no human behavior, least of all statecraft in pursuit of national security, can assume the ideal. The world is fallen, full of evil, human frailty, and limited capacity. The reality is that terrorist havens are usually in regions that are virtually ungoverned, like Somalia, or have local rulers unwilling or unable to take action against them, like parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen. Where there is competent and willing local law enforcement, the U.S. is not launching drones. Where such law enforcement is impossible, what then? Religious critics of drones rarely offer specific alternatives. Instead, they morally fault drones for imprecision, susceptible to harming innocents, and impersonally guided by desk-bound pilots who, with their bureaucratic overlords, may be cavalier because they are themselves not at risk. The anti-drone letter from Mainline Protestants cited “remote, technical warfare,” which has the “potential to encourage overuse and extension of the policy to more countries and more perceived threats.” But almost all forms of modern warfare are “remote” and “technical.” Combatants no longer typically battle each other with swords and lances. Absent the option of effective law enforcement against terrorists, the range of options include conventional aerial bombing or cruise missiles, both of which are pretty “remote,” or a military personnel excursion similar to the U.S. Navy SEAL mission that dispatched Osama bin Laden. None of these options avoids the possibility of accidentally killing innocents. Drones may in fact be likelier to be precise. All of these options, no less than drones, enrage and terrify local populations, especially if they politically sympathize with the terrorists. And sending armed personnel onto the ground in dangerous territory obviously subjects them to possible death or capture. Unlike most religious critics of drones, the Catholic letter admitted the legitimacy of national defense against terrorism. But like other critics, it suggested counter-terrorism is “primarily a law enforcement activity,” and urged a wider “range of economic, political and diplomatic responses in order to get at the root causes and injustices that terrorists exploit.” But what to do when aid programs, diplomacy and international collaboration fail? Or what if such collaboration actually dictates drones strikes, with local regimes tacitly encouraging their use against terrorist regime opponents they cannot reach? American idealism often imagines that American power can achieve any goal with good will and sufficient exertion. But in the real world not all terrorists and their supporters can be neutralized with a subpoena, a government check, or high-minded mediation. The Christian Just War tradition is not a rigid formula with which clerics and academics badger governments with impossibly lofty standards. It’s a tool primarily for practitioners of statecraft to achieve an approximate justice with the available means in an always flawed situation. Lethal force is acceptable and sometimes morally imperative if more innocents will suffer without it. Drones that kill terrorists are among the most precise weapons ever developed. They often are morally preferable to the available alternatives. All governments are ordained to protect their people. And any government that shuns the available tools in defense of its people and in pursuit of justice has failed its vocation.

#### Their racism argument doesn’t make sense---we’ve never called any non-white subjects as THREAT---1nc evidence outlines specific threats like al qaeda or other organizations like LeT in Pakistan who attacked India’s high value target in 2008 Mumbai attacks---prove that there’s no link.

#### Terrorist threats are real---you should default to our scholarly and peer-reviewed work on terrorism---it’s not a blanket claim.

Exum 12 Andrew Exum is a Senior Fellow with the Center for a New American Security. A native of East Tennessee, Exum was educated in Philadelphia, Beirut and London. From 2000 until 2004, Exum served on active duty in the U.S. Army. He led a platoon of light infantry in Kuwait and Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 and later led a platoon of Army Rangers in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004, respectively. Exum returned to Afghanistan in 2009 to serve as an advisor to Gen. Stanley McChrystal and subsequently participated in an assessment conducted for Gen. David Petraeus in 2010. Exum served as a subject matter expert on Egypt and the Levant for the 2008-2009 CENTCOM Assessment Team. Exum earned a B.A. in classics and English literature from the University of Pennsylvania in 2000 and received the Cane Award upon graduation. He later earned an M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from the American University of Beirut and a Ph.D. in War Studies from the University of London. Exum has also formally studied in Cairo, Paris and Tangier. Exum aims to engage in conversations with his readers through social media. While on a one-year fellowship at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Exum started a blog on small wars and insurgencies, Abu Muqawama, that he continues to edit at CNAS. Exum was also named by Foreign Policy magazine as one of the top 100 voices in foreign policy on Twitter. Exum is a member of the American Political Science Association, the Middle East Studies Association, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. “On Terrorism Experts,” 3-27-12, <http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2012/03/terrorism-experts.html>, DOA: 8-29-13, y2k

As those of you who follow my Twitter feed know, I have been drawn into a debate between Glenn Greenwald and Will McCants about whether or not one can be a "terrorism expert." Greenwald's position, as articulated on his blog: I had a somewhat lengthy debate on Twitter last night about the Awlaki assassination with several people often identified as “Terrorism experts” — such as Will McCants and Aaron Zelin — and they and others (such as Andrew Exum and Robert Farley) objected rather vigorously when I said I found the entire concept of “Terrorism expert” to be invalid, as it is a honorific typically assigned due to ideology and interests served rather than actual expertise. This is exactly what I meant: in U.S. political and media discourse, Terrorism means little more than: that which America’s Enemies du Jour (generally Muslim Enemies) do to it, but not what America and its allies do to anyone. Terrorism is not a real concept in which one develops “expertise”; it is, and from its introduction into world affairs always has been, a term of propaganda designed to legitimize violence by some actors while delegitimizing very similar violence by others. See the interview I conducted a couple of years ago with Remi Brulin of NYU for more on that. Annoyingly, Greenwald has a point in both his post and in his earlier tweets. The study of "terrorism" in the United States over the past decade has been shaped by the American experience on September 11th of 2001, and when Americans speak of terrorism in the popular discourse, as Greenwald noted in a tweet, the word is often short-hand for Islamist terrorism. Travel to the United Kingdom, by contrast, and a "terrorism expert" may have done his or her field work in Northern Ireland. Travel to Spain, and an expert may have done his or her work in the Basque country. Thomas Hegghammer has written more eloquently than I about the way in which the study of both terrorism and jihadi groups has evolved in the United States after 2001, and it's only natural that the study of terrorism will be distorted by the local experience of the country or region in which the research is conducted. But before I get side-tracked, let me break my response to Greenwald into two arguments. First, let us very briefly review the state of the literature in the study of terrorism and coercive violence. Greenwald is correct that "terrorism" has a pejorative connotation in the popular discourse. In the scholarly literature, though, terrorism has always meant something along the lines of "the threat or use of physical coercion, primarily against noncombatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various political objectives." (O'Neill, 2005) Greenwald makes it seem as if states are never mentioned as terrorist actors, but there is a lot of literature on the use of coercive violence by states and state terrorism. Off the top of my head, I'm thinking of Schelling (1966); Mitchell, Stohl, Carleton and Lopez (1986); Kalyvas (2006); and Biddle and Friedman (2008). (I'm sure readers of this blog can think of literally dozens more examples. Please do so in the comments section.) The literature on terrorism and terrorist groups did not spring forth on September 12, 2001. Researchers at my alma mater and elsewhere had been writing about the phenomena of terrorism and groups who use terror tactics for decades. Sometimes these researchers were doing case studies on Islamist or Palestinian groups. Sometimes they were doing case studies on Irish (PIRA) or German (RAF) groups. And sometimes they were comparing and contrasting varied groups. Walter Laqueur originally published this book, for example, in 1977. Bruce Hoffman published this book in 1999. I'm pretty sure those two guys are terrorism experts without the scare quotes. Second, let me consider the case of my friend Will McCants, who Greenwald very much picked on in his Twitter feed along with Aaron Zelin (who I do not know well but who seems really smart in his own right). Greenwald is correct that the decade after the September 11th attacks created all kinds of incentives for self-proclaimed terrorism "experts" to rise to the fore, hawking their "expertise" and opinions on both the consulting market as well as in the mainstream media. Too often, this expertise has been ignorant or barely concealed Islamophobia. Ironically, though, one of the scholars who has done the most to condemn what he calls "CT hucksters" is Will McCants. Will is one of the more rigorously credentialed scholars studying violent Islamist extremist groups as well as being one of the most careful. Will fell into a study of terrorism after doing a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton. He had no initial academic training in strategic studies or military affairs as far as I know, but his Arabic and understanding of the intellectual currents of political Islam made him ideal to work on al-Qaeda as a case study. And just like I started a dissertation on Hizballah with a background in Middle Eastern Studies and boned up on the theories related to small wars and insurgencies as I went along, so too did Will with respect to terrorism as a phenomenon. At the end of the day, Will is best described as an Arabist, perhaps, but if he is not a bona fide terrorism expert as well -- again, no scare quotes necessary this time -- I don't know who is. What irked me most about Greenwald's tweets and post is that he is disparaging an entire class of very reputable scholars with the allegation that the only people taken seriously as terrorism experts in the United States are taken seriously because of some media gate-keeper's ideological bias -- and not because of their study of specific terrorist groups and a phenemenon that has a deep body of peer-reviewed literature dedicated to it. Greenwald is attempting to limit and discipline the discourse in his own way. He is signaling to his readers that no true expertise on terrorism as a phenomenon exists and that those who write about it are hopelessly ideologically compromised in principio. That strikes me as close-minded intellectual bullying. If you're going to bully people, bully the bad guys. And if you're going to make blanket judgments about entire fields of study but are not yourself an expert in that field of study, have a little humility when you do so. After all, you don't see me telling Glenn Greenwald what's what about due process or Constitutional law, do you?

#### Nature of drone intervention is also the opposite---discriminating threats in decapitation is key to make sure that only the LEADERS of terrorist oragnizations are killed---you have no uniqueness because intervention is inevitable, it’s just a question of using SMARTER intervention. That’s also tooley.

### Hegemony DA

#### No impact defense to Kagan evidence--- Hegemony DA outweighs---collapses causes nuclear conflict and destroys global institutions---their lashout claims about revenge is INEVITABLE because of power competition---means even if they win the thesis of the 1ac, only a hegemonic unipolar power can terminally prevent the escalation of those conflicts.

#### Their evidence says that military does things like sexual violence---this is all inevitable---they don’t wish away the military---we only made arguments about the particular international system---which means we don’t link---still the impact terminally outweighs.

Goldstein 1 professor of IR – American University, Joshua S, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, pg. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.10

#### Their K of military is wrong.

Holewinski et al 12 Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of Center for Civilians in Conflict, led staff from the Center in conceptualization of the report, and additional research and writing, including with Golzar Kheiltash, Erin Osterhaus and Lara Berlin. The report was designed by Marla Keenan of Center for Civilians in Conflict. Liz Lucas of Center for Civilians in Conflict led media outreach with Greta Moseson, program coordinator at the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School. The Columbia Human Rights Clinic and the Columbia Human Rights Institute are grateful to the Open Society Foundations and Bullitt Foundation for their financial support of the Institute’s Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, and to Columbia Law School for its ongoing support. “THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS,” This report is the product of a collaboration between the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict. 2012, http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/The%20Civilian%20Impact%20of%20Drones.pdf, Accessed Date: 7-8-13 y2k

The conventional military forces’ relationship to the law, the public, and the issue of civilian harm is a useful baseline for judging the CIA and JSOC. Their structures and processes reflect an interest in engaging with complex legal and ethical issues, instilling respect for the law in personnel, and taking extra steps—beyond legal requirements—to reduce and respond to civilian harm. We note that these efforts do not negate human rights concerns with regard to US military operations. The 1968 My Lai massacre was a watershed event for the US military.278 Chilling accounts of the deliberate and sustained killings of an estimated 500 unarmed men, women, and children over the course of four hours in a small Vietnamese village put in focus serious problems with the military’s adherence to international laws forbidding the targeting of civilians.279 As military leaders and policymakers evaluated what went wrong at My Lai and in other incidents, they identified troops’ respect for the law as a foremost problem. Enemy fighters in the Viet Cong were not only “indistinguishable from the local population, but also refused to abide by the established principles of the laws of war”—circumstances that led troops to view the law as irrelevant.280 “This is the first lesson of My Lai; soldiers not only must know the law of war, but also must be able to understand the necessity and rationale for having a law of war,” wrote two judge advocates on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of My Lai in 1993.281 After My Lai, the Department of Defense designed a comprehensive program to effectively implement the laws of armed conflict (alternatively called International Humanitarian Law and henceforth “laws of war”) and change the relationship of its armed forces to the law from one of reluctant tolerance to engagement and internalization. In 1974, the Department promulgated a directive mandating that every member of the military be trained in the laws of war, and assigning primary responsibility for training and law compliance to unit com- manders. The directive mandated the reporting of war crimes, and timely and proper investigations.282 A version of the 1974 directive is in place today. It unequivocally requires that all Department of Defense organizations comply with the laws of war during all armed conflicts and “in all other military operations.”283 Post-Vietnam law of war training emphasized the rationales and underpinnings of the laws of war. W. Hays Park, former chief of the Law of War branch of the Navy’s Office of Judge Advocate, has described post-Vietnam training on the law as “marrying” law of war obligations “to military effectiveness, professionalism and good leadership.”284 Implementation of the laws of war, according to Hays: “… requires an ethos. It requires comprehensive implementation, in peace and war, at all levels of armed forces.”285 Today, there are dozens of rules, mechanisms, and official guidance’s that motivate legal compliance and integrate law of war norms into the ethos of the armed services. Indeed, several of the services explicitly describe law of war compliance as part of the “warrior ethos”: having “the honor to comply with the Laws of War, the courage to report all violations, and the commitment to discipline the violators.”286 When abuses against detainees occurred during military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, military personnel themselves took a lead role in reporting them up the chain of command and to the media— even though they risked retaliation from other soldiers, disciplinary action, and prosecution as whistleblowers.287 Some military practitioners and scholars viewed abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq not merely as violations committed by a few individuals that damaged the Army’s reputation, but as violations of the Army’s ethos that undermined the institution. As one military scholar noted: Army ethos requires the strict adherence to all laws governing the conduct of war. And since the Army ethos is a fundamental attribute of Army professionalism, if [sic] follows that the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib directly undermined the foundations of Army professionalism.288 Another result of the post-My Lai transformation of the military was the creation of institutions to foster understanding of the law’s application. For example, judge advocates undertake law of war training at the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School or programs administered by the Navy and Air Force.289 In 1988, the US Army established the Center for Law and Military Operations, which publishes the Law of War Deskbook, a da- tabase for judge advocates around the world.290 Judge advocates are actively involved in practical training operations at four Combat Training Centers, where training units engage in simulated combat and peace operations.291 This system of teaching and practical application of the laws of war has also led to the emergence of a culture of critique and debate around difficult legal and moral questions. For example, members of the armed forces have published critiques of the effectiveness of military systems for investigating civilian deaths, and of the battle damage assessments undertaken after targeting.292 The Naval War College annually hosts a symposium on international law that brings together leading military practitioners, scholars, human rights lawyers, and government lawyers from the US and other countries to debate and consider emerging issues.293 At outside conferences on international law, military lawyers and scholars regularly organize lectures and debates, and engage with outsiders who may disagree with their stance. Recently developed military rules and procedures sometimes reflect not only the strict and uncontroversial requirements of the law, but an interest in going beyond the law to mitigate civilian harm. Rules of engagement in Afghanistan have, for example, restricted the number of civilian casualties that are acceptable in targeting operations beyond what might be required by international law.294 For some operations, the military uses a collateral damage estimates (CDEs) to assess likely civilian harm from an operation and consider ways to reduce it. CDEs are reportedly based on “empirical data, probability, historical observations from the battlefield, and physics-based computerized models.”295 CDEs reportedly draw from frequently updated reference tables that are subject to “physics-based computer modeling” and “supplemented by weapons testing data and direct combat observations.”296 These processes have a cultural effect. For example, according to a 2010 government study, directives focused on mitigating civilian harm in Afghanistan bolstered the ability of Air Force pilots “not to engage because they perceived risks of civilian casualties.”297 Conventional military forces also sometimes conduct “battle damage assessments” after strikes and, when civilian harm has occurred, have in some cases provided medical aid or initiated a process of amends for losses.298 We discuss these procedures in more detail in the chapter Civilian Protection Limitations. These progressive policies and practices are motivated not only by the internalization of norms described above, but by public pressure in foreign countries and at home—including the high visibility of civilian casualties in an era of 24/7 news, cell phone cameras, and YouTube. As Jack Goldsmith has noted, the growth of global television and the Internet have “made war observable anywhere, practically in real time.”299 In Afghanistan, new procedures are also motivated by a counterinsurgency strategy that requires the military to “win hearts and minds.” A 2010 tactical directive issued by General David Petraeus emphasizes: “Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause.”300 The first US Army manual on civilian casualty mitigation, published in July 2012, emphasizes that even unavoidable or lawful civilian casualties “will be publicized by the news media and critically viewed by the American people, the local population, and the international community.” It cautions that “operations against insurgents may have to be postponed or modified if [civilian casualties] and other collateral damage would undercut mission goals or political support.”301 While the procedures and engagement with the public we have described do not immunize conventional military forces from committing abuses, they significantly contrast with the CIA and JSOC’s secrecy and failure to publicly signal a commitment to reducing civilian harm.

#### Their imaginary argument doesn’t make sense---we will argue that the system of unipolarity is the most stable international system---it checks aggressive foreign policy and lash out---solves their link.

Amir Lupovici 8 is Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies University of Toronto. “Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse,” <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf>, Accessed date: 1-14-13 y2k

Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve ontological security, securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily life—the essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that enables and constrains the actors’ possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities. Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and break away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the security dilemma, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are restrained from using violence—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but “ironically, may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity”. In such cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security, 21 the existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002: 331-2) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more stable expectations of avoiding violence.

#### This also begs the question of intervention---No impact to threat construction---political systems based on checks and balances constrain the executive---Vietnam and Iraq empirically proves that public opinion could restrain lashouts---means no impact to threat constructions. That’s Gray.

### Consequentialism

#### Consequentialism is best---Issac evidence says that it’s the most ethical system based on taking everyone into calculation—that’s key to maximize ethical benefits for everyone---still allows discussion of particular violence, means no offense.

#### All lives are infinitely valuable.

Cummisky 96 David Cummisky, Professor of Philosophy @ Bates College. 1996. “Kantian Consequentialism.” 145-146.

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

#### Preventing nuclear war is the prerequisite to solving systemic impacts

Folk 78 Folk, Prof of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, Jerry, “Peace Educations – Peace Studies: Towards an Integrated Approach,” Peace & Change, Vol. V, No. 1, spring, P. 58

Those proponents of the positive peace approach who reject out of hand the work of researchers and educators coming to the field from the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that the prevention of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other peace research, education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can be avoided there will be no world left in which to build positive peace. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of all such negative peace oriented research, education or action as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire. Conflict theory and resolution, disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in themselves neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or for some purpose in between. It is much more logical for those who understand peace as positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purposes. A balanced peace studies program should therefore offer the student exposure to the questions and concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace.

#### We control uniqueness—human well-being is on the rise

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Although global population is no longer growing exponentially, it has quadrupled since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or GDP per capita) has sextupled, global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4 But contrary to Neo- Malthusian fears, average **human well-being,** measured by any objective indicator, has never been higher. Food supplies, Malthus’ original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased from 2,254 Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide. The proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1969–71 and 2001–2003 despite an 87 percent population increase (Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006). The reduction in hunger and malnutrition, along with improvements in basic hygiene, improved access to safer water and sanitation, broad adoption of vaccinations, antibiotics, pasteurization and other public health measures, helped reduce mortality and increase life expectancies. These improvements first became evident in today’s developed countries in the mid- to late-1800s and started to spread in earnest to developing countries from the 1950s. The infant mortality rate in developing countries was 180 per 1,000 live births in the early 1950s; today it is 57. Consequently, global life expectancy, perhaps the single most important measure of human well-being, increased from 31 years in 1900 to 47 years in the early 1950s to 67 years today (Goklany 2007a). Globally, average **annual per capita incomes** tripled since 1950. The proportion of the world’s population outside of high-income OECD countries living in absolute poverty (average consumption of less than $1 per day in 1985 International dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity), fell from 84 percent in 1820 to 40 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2007 (Goklany 2007a; WRI 2008; World Bank 2007). Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. In most countries, people are freer politically, economically and socially to pursue their goals as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb and property. Social and professional mobility has never been greater. It is easier to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth in the lottery of life. People work fewer hours, and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time (Goklany 2007a). Figure 3 summarizes the U.S. experience over the 20th century with respect to growth of population, affluence, material, fossil fuel energy and chemical consumption, and life expectancy. It indicates that population has multiplied 3.7-fold; income, 6.9-fold; carbon

dioxide emissions, 8.5-fold; material use, 26.5-fold; and organic chemical use, 101-fold. Yet its life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years and infant mortality (not shown) declined from over 100 per 1,000 live births to 7 per 1,000. It is also important to note that not only are people living longer, they are healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite better diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) occur 8–11 years later now than a century ago (Fogel 2003; Manton et al. 2006). If similar figures could be constructed for other countries, most would indicate qualitatively similar trends, especially after 1950, except Sub-Saharan Africa and the erstwhile members of the Soviet Union. In the latter two cases, life expectancy, which had increased following World War II, declined after the late 1980s to the early 2000s, possibly due poor economic performance compounded, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by AIDS, resurgence of malaria, and tuberculosis due mainly to poor governance (breakdown of public health services) and other manmade causes (Goklany 2007a, pp.66–69, pp.178–181, and references therein). However, there are signs of a turnaround, perhaps related to increased economic growth since the early 2000s, although this could, of course, be a temporary blip (Goklany 2007a; World Bank 2008a). Notably, in most areas of the world, the healthadjusted life expectancy (HALE), that is, life expectancy adjusted downward for the severity and length of time spent by the average individual in a less-than-healthy condition, is greater now than the unadjusted life expectancy was 30 years ago. HALE for the China and India in 2002, for instance, were 64.1 and 53.5 years, which exceeded their unadjusted life expectancy of 63.2 and 50.7 years in 1970–1975 (WRI 2008). Figure 4, based on cross country data, indicates that contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears, both life expectancy and infant mortality improve with the level of affluence (economic development) and time, a surrogate for technological change (Goklany 2007a). Other indicators of human well-being that improve over time and as affluence rises are: access to safe water and sanitation (see below), literacy, level of education, food supplies per capita, and the prevalence of malnutrition (Goklany 2007a, 2007b).

### Threat

#### Threats real and not constructed—rational risk assessment goes aff

Knudsen 1– PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a **misleading conception of threat**, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena **do not occur simultaneously** to large numbers of politicians, and **hardly most of the time**. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they **refer to 'real' phenomena** now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that **urgent action may be required**. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because **situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back** and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

### No Root cause

#### No root cause of war- consensus of experts is on our side---holsti says that there are multiple cause of war---they gloss over them.

### Realism

#### Yes takes out---enemy creation is inevitable---Realism is inevitable---decisionmakers pursues system of self interest and naturally suspisious of other international actors’ interests---prefer our evidence because it’s specific to governmental policymaking. That’s Guzzini.

### Biopower

## Narration

#### Methodological focus is bad---leads to scholarly inaction because it leads to endless questioning of foundational assumptions that gloss over complex empirical situations---means aff can’t solve. That’s Jackson.

#### Narratives are entirely subjective and has no external criteria for evaluation---Chartier and Cosgrove say that focus on narratives leads to partial view that previleges essentialized mode of production---that leads to homogenizing difference and reinforces normative behavior.